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Robin Luckham
Nothing sharpens debate like crisis. The analyses
presented in this Bulletin call attention to the
interconnections between recession and the global
arms race, between the crises in North-South and
East-West relations. It is no longer possible to take
decisions on any major global issue without
considering how it relates to other items on the global
agenda. We live in a state of interdependent
disequilibrium.
To chart our way through the chaos we tend to
construct ideologies, or cognitive maps of the world
we live in [Geertz 1973; see also the discussion by Cox
(1979) of the ideologies of the new international
economic order]. Sometimes these maps are wholly
implicit, their hidden structures only being revealed,
piecemeal, when analyses are made or decisions taken
regarding particular issues. Sometimes (as in the case
of many academic disciplines, to the extent that they
can be regarded as ideological as well as intellectual
constructs) their structures are partly out in the open,
the remainder being tidied away among the 'other
things being equal'. Development economics, for
example, has excluded (arguably necessarily so)
political and social questions from its theoretical
purview. Interdisciplinary development studies arose
from the discovery by many development practitioners
that these criteria were too restrictive. Development
studies in its turn has had more success in assimilating
some areas of political and social enquiry (such as the
role of the state in development) than others (like
international conflict, military power, nationalism or
fundamentalist religion), perhaps because the latter
raise more serious difficulties for the assumption that
development can be managed by national decision-
makers if they can only implement appropriate
policies.
The past decade and a half of international crisis has
witnessed a series of attempts to assemble comprehen-
sive pictures of the global situation. They include the
Brandt, Palme and Thorsson reports. But they also
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include a rehabilitation of geopolitics in more
conservative political circles and within military
establishments. The military budget requests and
planning documents of the major western powers
(and, no doubt, the strategic assessments of Eastern
military planners) have for some years given
prominence to energy and resources in the Third
World. The second page of the annual Military
Posture statement of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for
Financial Year 1985 for example, includes the map in
Figure 1, depicting potential sources of conflict in
'resource rich regions of instability'. As pointed out in
the Editorial (page 1; see also Commission on
Security and Economic Assistance 1983) such views
are already affecting the allocation of development
assistance.
Development practitioners themselves need not adopt
such a crude geopolitical view. But they must be able
to put forward credible alternatives. One way of
beginning this task is to consider the relative strengths
and weaknesses of a number of the different scenarios
for reshaping the international order that have
emerged in recent discussions, presented here in the
form of schematic flow diagrams.
The reader should recall that these are loose
cognitive maps rather than developed theoretical
structures. Moreover the areas of uncertainty are so
wide that they are more like the maps of medieval
cartographers than the precise lines of the Ordnance
Survey. Each contains a mixture of logical statements,
empirical assertions, normative prescriptions and
unstated presumptions. They provide a reasoned base
for the policy choices that have to be made in a
complex and unstable international environment:
desperate attempts to turn the angel of history
forward. Nor are they necessarily invalidated by the
objection (see the article by Holm in this Bulletin) that
the relationships they assume - e.g. between military
spending and slow growth - remain unproven. To be
sure, if none of these relationships could be
demonstrated, the scenarios would provide extremely
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poor foundations for policy. Nor would they be much
use (however valid their analysis) if they could not
identify the political forces that might implement their
vision.
But if our scenarios provide so uncertain a map of the
international situation and so are difficult to translate
into practical politics, would we not do better without
them? Would it not be preferable to deal with
development issues on a piecemeal basis as they arise
in each country, in case linking them too closely to
other items on the global agenda (like disarmament)
gets in the way? There are two simple answers to such
objections..First, the view that the issues are separable
also implies a global scenario (in my view a false one)
of a piecemeal world of autonomous economies and
separable national parts. Second, development
practitioners already have to contend with a number
of scenarios which have been put onto the
international agenda by internationally powerful
groups.
Four of the six scenarios presented in this article (the
Trilateralist, the Monetarist-Militarist, the European
Gaullist and 'Socialism-as-it-Actually-Exists') fall
into the category of proposals for restoring one form
or another of the international status quo. None of
them, however, envisage a neutral stability . Rather
they are orchestrated around the power and interests
of particular dominant classes and nation-states. Nor
indeed do they really provide for a real status quo, for
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they all assume the continuation of the arms race and
provide little basis for curbing the cyclical momentum
of the global economy. They represent, in sum, four
different ways of riding a tiger.
The fifth and sixth scenarios (the Brandt-Palme-
Thorsson and the Global Transformation scenarios)
provide two alternative paradigms (not necessarily the
only ones) for planned change in the international
order: in the one case through a systematic
aggregation of piecemeal reforms instituted in the
main from above by the more progressive members of
the global policy-making elite; in the other case
through global transformations linked to political
mobilisation from below.
The proposals put forward in the Trilateral and
Brandt-Palme-Thorsson scenarios can be pinned
down to specific publications and groups of people;
even though there are some internal differences of
opinion amongst the latter not reflected in the
scenarios. The others are my own reconstructions of
four distinct world views which have tended to emerge
in international discussions, without necessarily being
explicitly formulated in the form shown in the
diagrams: they are ideal types'.
Let us briefly consider each of the six scenarios in turn.
The trilateral scenario summarises the ideas and
policies advanced in the reports of the Trilateral
Commission in the 1970s (a useful but somewhat
jaundiced view of which is provided in Sklar 1980).
The Commission was founded by David Rockefeller,
the Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, later to become President
Carter's National Security Advisor, and other
'eminent private citizens' from the United States,
Western Europe and Japan (hence the term
'trilateral'). Its formation was a direct response to the
collapse ofthe Bretton Woods system of international
payments and the decline of US global power after the
Vietnam war. The height of its influence was under the
Carter administration in the United States, President
Carter himself and several of his key advisors being
members.
Broadly speaking, the trilateralists proposed restruc-
turing the international economic order on the basis of
managed capitalism and partnership between US,
Western European and Japanese corporate capital;
while preserving the foundations of Western global
power on the basis of the NATO alliance and arms
control negotiations with the USSR. Their policies
toward the Third World were less clear, being founded
on the one hand on strategic interests and support for
'political order' and on the other hand on claims to
moral authority established through aid and advocacy
of human rights. In the event, the less liberal strands in
the trilateralist programme prevailed (for an insider's
view of how this came about see Brzezinski 1983). It
was the Carter administration which created the
Rapid Deployment Force and initiated the increases in
military spending that were carried through under
President Reagan.
The proponents of the monetarist/mi/itarist scenario,
on the other hand, were brought to prominence by the
final collapse of the political consensus around which
managed capitalism, the politics of the centre, East-
West detente and arms control had been based. This
collapse was partly brought on by the second phase of
the recession which began in the late 1970s; but it also
reflected the deteriorating international political
situation.
The scenario's most distinctive characteristic has been
the combination of liberal economics and muscular
geopolitics. The one does not follow logically from the
other; indeed there are monetarist economists
(including President Reagan's former Budget Director)
who regard military spending as a major obstacle to
sound finance. However, the juxtaposition is not
accidental. For economic restructuring - both under
monetarist economic policy in the advanced economies
and 'structural adjustment' in the Ides - has almost
inevitably caused major social dislocations, hence
conflict. Moreover, the 'new right' has given as much
emphasis to competition among states and national
economies as to competition in the market between
firms. The former, unlike the latter, encourages the use
of military power to protect or acquire non-market
advantages. The temptation to do so has been
especially strong for declining world powers, such as
the USA and the UKall the more when the military
sector is one of the few in which they have been able to
keep a competitive edge.
Gaul/ist scenarios on the other hand have taken state
power and national capitalism as their starting point.
The 'project' for France embarked on by General de
Gaulle and followed with remarkable consistency by
his successors, including the Socialist government of
President Mitterand [Euckham 1982] has been based
on six interrelated priorities: an 'independent' defence
and nuclear deterrent; a self-sufficient defence-
industrial base, supported where necessary by arms
exports to the Third World; planned capitalism with
an emphasis on the high-technology sectors; dialogue
with the USSR and closer economic relations with
Eastern Europe; cultivation of political alliances in the
Third World through aid policy and well publicised
support for the NIEO; and direct military presence in
regions of French influence, notably Francophone
Africa and the Pacific.
The relative decline of the US economy, economic
protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic and
tensions within NATO are the context of proposals for
what would in effect be a European version of the
Gaullist project. The outlines of such a scenario have
begun to emerge from discussions of European
defence and political cooperation that have taken
place in the revived Western European Union and
other international fora. If these initiatives were to
succeed, they would have far-reaching implications
for European economic cooperation, for East-West
relations and for Europe's relationships with the Third
World, spelt Out Ifl the diagram. Nevertheless, the
political viability of the scenario is far from
established, due to the well-known difficulties of
European cooperation on economic let alone political
issues.
The scenario of' Socialism-as-it-actually-exists' [Bahro
19781 can only be extrapolated from the USSR's
international behaviour, since explicit statements of
the rationale for Soviet and East European policies are
few and far between. Its most striking features are the
normalisation of relationships with the capitalist
world economy [Valkenier 1979]; and the assertion of
the USSR's superpower parity with the USA, based in
turn on consolidation of the Eastern bloc and the
primacy of the military sector within the Soviet
economy [Holloway 1983]. These goals have in
practice been given priority over the construction of
socialism and support for states of socialist
orientation in the Third World.
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Thus in some respects the arms race and the system of
blocs have brought about a symmetry between East
and West, most directly visible in the military sector.
Nevertheless the symmetry has been disturbed by the
tendency of the Soviet Union to seek room for
manoeuvre beyond the accepted framework of the
Cold War. This is a tendency which many Western
policy-makers have regarded as a source of
international instability (as with Soviet 'intervention'
on behalf of revolutionary governments in the Third
World). One could equally well argue that it opens up
opportunities for change, both in the Third World
where the non-aligned movement has made full use of
the rivalry between East and West, and in Europe
where it complements the Ostpolitik of West
European governments.
All four of the above scenarios still envisage a world
trapped in the arms race and unable to transform a
stagnating and polarised world economy. The B,andt-
Pa/rne-Thorsson scenario' offers a programme for
global reform. The proposals of the three Commissions
from which this scenario is extracted are fully
discussed elsewhere in this Bulletin. I shall merely
reiterate the two major criticisms that have been made
of them. First, that it cannot be assumed, without
further analysis, the resources released by military cuts
would in fact be used for development. And second,
that the political processes by which such an ambitious
programme of reform could be carried through in a
world in which power politics are the dominant
principle, have not been adequately considered.
The global transformation scenario addresses such
political questions more directly, although it still
incorporates many of the specific Brandt-Palme-
Thorsson proposals. lt is perhaps even more of an
extrapolation than the other scenarios. Although
there is no shortage of analysis of individual issues
(disarmament, ecological balance. Third World self-
reliance etc.), there have been few attempts to pull
them together within an analytical framework or as a
political programme. (The 'Out of Crisis' project of a
Inga Thorsson has reminded me that similar conclusions were
arrived ai h anoiher major in)erriaiional commission. thi,it on
Reshaping the Inteirtational Order) RIO) chaired by Jan Tinhergen.
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group of leading European socialist economists spells
out a programme for European recovery, from which
elements of the scenario are drawn [Holland 19831.
But it does not deal centrally with either disarmament
or the Third World.2 The UN University's programme
on Peace and Global Transformation has developed
scenarios for global change, but has not yet placed
them on the international agenda.)
Unlike Brandt-Palme-Thorsson. this scenario
emphasises the scope for unilateral action by states or
groups of states alongside multilateral negotiation. It is
less sanguine about free market mechanisms. And it
identifies groups and political forces that could be
mobilised to press for change, rather than relying on
the political will of policy-makers. Nevertheless it
shares some of the same difficulties. It is not clear how
conflicts of interest (e.g. between advanced industrial
countries restructuring their industry behind pro-
tective barriers, and NICs hoping to increase their
manufactured exports) would be dealt with. The
analytical and practical basis for a number of the
assertions in the scenario could be questioned. Is 'self-
reliant' development really a viable option for
developing countries with open economies and small
domestic markets? Could solutions to social injustices
in the Middle East or Southern Africa be found
without major armed conflict or at the very least
without escalation into a broader global confrontation?
Would powerful groups in the industrial North permit
the dismantling of the major military alliance systems
without putting up a struggle? Would political
movements operating outside established power
politics, however widely supported, be strong enough
to oblige them to do so? These questions are asked to
emphasise that any global scenario is only a starting
point. It can provide some sense of how a series of
interrelated changes might fit together. But until the
more detailed issues are realistically tackled, the
global agenda will continue to be set by the established
international power brokers.
Since ibis article was written the Third World (hut not the
disarmament) dimension Itas been added h the Report oh tIte
Socialist International Committee on Eciinomie Polic\ 1985.
Notes to the Scenarios
Each scenario depicts West-East relations on the horizontal axis and North-South relations on the vertical axis.
The top diagram portrays the economic dimensions of these relationships and the lower diagram the
political/strategic, although the argument of this paper is that the two are systematically related. In lieu of a
three-dimensional diagram the connections have been made, where possible, in the text.
Arrows with a single head indicate unidirectional or unequal relationships; and with a single head two-way or
balanced relationships. Thick lines are used for strong relationships, broken lines for weaker ones and no lines when
there is little or no relationship.
Abbreviations
ACP
CAP
CMEA
EEC
EMS
IMF
LDCs
MNCs
NATO
NICs
NIEO
NPT
OPEC
Ostpolitik
RDF
SALT
SDI
TW
UN
WTO
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries linked to the EEC
Common Agricultural Policy
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (i.e. COMECON)
European Economic Community
European Monetary System
International Monetary Fund
Less Developed Countries
Multinational Corporations
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Newly Industrialising Countries
New International Economic Order
Non Proliferation Treaty
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Policy of improving relations with Eastern Europe
Rapid Deployment Force (now renamed US Central Command)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars)
Third World
United Nations
Warsaw Treaty Organisation
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Management of interdepen-
dence'. Coordinated expansion
of industrial market economies
(USA, Europe, Japan) achieved
through corporatist alliances
between state, large firms and
organised labour.
(MNCs relocate
capital and pro-
duction t ward NICs.
s
s
s
s
s
I
Restructuring of Pax Americana
on multilateral basis through
NATO and US-Japan Security
Treaty. Consolidation of bi-
partisan consensus on defence
and foreign policy within the
major Western democracies. Co-
ordinated increases in NATO
military spending.
NICs helped to become more
'self reliant' as regards their
security (the Nixon doctrine)
and their arms production.
THE TRILATERALIST SCENARIO
OPEC surpluses 'managed' under
international energy agreements,
as well as being recycled through
arms transfers and international
credit mechanisms.
LDCs pulled into recovery y revival of world raw material
demand, international credit expansion and increased
multilateral aid. 'Political order', Investment by MNCs and
planned capitalism provide framework for international
development.
West's OPEC stake protected by
alliances with 'moderate' regimes,
arms sales and build-up of rapid
deployment forces, able to inter-
vene to protect energy supplies
(the Carter doctrine).
Ideologisation of Western relations with Third World in form
of aid and humais rights, simultaneously with military
support for 'moderate' regimes. Stability assured where
possible under TW regional security arrangements.
Socialist economies increasingly
dependent on the world economy
for credit, technology and grain.
increasing the \\'est's economic
leverage. Increase in joini
ventures between socialist enter-
prise and MNCs.
Restoration/preservation of
'strategic balance' between
NATO and Warsaw Pact within
framework of detente and bi-
lateral East-West arms control
negotiations (SALT, etc.).
J
Sound money, budget cuts and
labour discipline restore com-
petitiveness and profits in major
Western economies, especially
USA. Military spending and
high technology ('silicone valley')
pave way for recovery.
y
I
Recession exported through high
interest rates. International
economic cooperation de-
emphasised. Aggressive inter-
capitalist competition; survival
of the fittest.
Growth of NICs slowed by
contracting manufactured export
demand and high interest rates.
'Resurgent America'. New mili-
tary programmes (Star Wars,
Air-Land Battle. RDF. Cruise.
Pershing etc.) not merely close
'window of vulnerability' but re-
establish global US military
supremacy.
C
y
Reaffirmation of US hegemony
in NATO. despite European
assertiveness and shift of centre
of strategic gravity to Pacific rim
and Persian Gulf.
y
Transfer of arms and political
technologies to labour-repressive
regimes in NICs.
THE MONETARIST/MILITARIST SCENARIO
OPEC bargaining power reduced
by falling world energy demand
and conversion to nuclear power.
LDC debts increase. Shift from multilateral to bilateral aid
linked to donor strategic interests and market-oriented
'structural adjustment'. LDCs return to traditional raw
material exporting role.
Construction of new 'security
framework' in Middle East
around RDF and alliances with
Israel and conservative Arab
regimes. Direct use of force (and
threats) to protect energy.
minerals, lines of communication.
Socialist (CMEA) economies
uncompetitive, burdened by arms
race, saddled with debt and
denied fruits of Western techno-
logical progress by restrictions
on transfers of military-related
technology.
Containment of 'Soviet threat'
central goal of US and NATO
foreign policy. Low priority
given to serious East-West arms
negotiations. 'Linkage' of the
latter to Soviet 'non-intervention'
in TW.
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t
Authoritarian regimes preside over economic restructuring in
LDCs. Human rights violations no longer an obstacle to
assistance to pro-West governments. Acttve destabilisation of
socialist regimes.
'¼
r»
US economy continues decline.
US-based MNCs unable to re-
capture competitive advantage
by relocating in Europe.
[
\\
European merchantilism; planned
national capitalisms coordinated
inside enlarged EEC. Rationali-
sation of CAP, full implement-
ation of EMS and European
Political Cooperation etc. State
and EEC promotion of high
technology (including defence)
industries.
$
$
Sales of political (military,
nuclear, communications etc.)
technologies open up NIC
markets. NICs take up arms
production and export in co-
operation with European defence
firms.
US concedes parity to Europe
within more decentralised NATO
alliance with 'independent' Euro-
pean deterrent(s).
$
European defence cooperation
increased including space and
eventually nuclear systems. Joint
development, production and
procurement of weapons,
emphasising high technology
and civilian spin-offs.
Relations with new world power
centres cemented through
military and political technology
transfers.
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THE GAULLIST EUROPE SCENARIO
t
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tttttttttttttt
I
Reappropriation of oil surpluses
through sale of capital goods
and weapons to OPEC countries.
Reconstitution of neocolonial framework around bilateral
and multilateral (European-ACP) relations with former
colonies. Cultivation of broader TW constituencies through
aid, technology transfers and support for NIEO.
1/
(Europe's
alleged 'independence'
of superpowers used to pursue
influence and military markets
in Middle East.
Cultivation of relations with TW governments across the
ideological spectrum. Yet simultaneous build-up of Europe's
naval and rapid action forces able to intervene militarily
outside NATO area.
Ostpolitik opens way for in-
creased economic relations with
E. Europe, with emphasis on
sales of technology and joint
ventures.
A 'credible' European defence
and nuclear deterrent, along
with East-West detente in Europe
under Ostpolitik. US not per-
mitted veto over W. European
relations with communist bloc.
Europe consulted in strategic
negotiations between the super-
powers.
g
g
g
gIII
g
gI
g
g
g
g
¡
Competitive edge of Western
capitalism within 'single world
economy' tacitly acknowledged,
despite long-run economic crisis
r» and class conflict. Drive to
acquire Western technology in
order to catch up.
Y
[Interimperial
rivalry between
US/European/Japanese capital
undermines Western capitalism;
creates openings for CMEA
economic transactions with West.
A
Y
[NICs
challenge supremacy of
Western capital and become
source of economic opportunities
for CMEA under joint ventures,
counter-trade agreements etc.
USSR maintains strategic parity
with USA, and status as a global
superpower. Arms control
negotiations restrain US attempts l-4
r to regain the strategic advantagethrough SD! technology, and re-
establish the basis for detente.
A
NATO alliance undermined by
interimperial rivalries and rise of
peace movements. East-West
European detente proceeds
through bilateral government
contacts and multilateral Helsinki
framework.
A[ Emergence of alternative power
centres in NlCs cautiously wel-
L comed, with misgivings con-
cerning their relations with the
West and over nuclear pro-
liferation.
'SOCIALISM-AS-IT-ACTUALLY-EXISTS' SCENARIO
'4
'4
'4
'4
s... '4
'4
*1 '4'4
I
Saks of weapons and capital
goods to 'progressive' OPEC
states exploit USSR's com-
parative advantage in military
and heavy industries and earn
hard currency for technology
purchases.
TW bears brunt of crisis in capitalism. Nevertheless USSR
directs its limited economic assistance toward small circle of
TW socialist countries already linked to CMEA and to non-
socialist LDCs, from which raw materials acquired under
'buy-back' arrangements.
ISoviet
arms and influence redis-
tributed through progressive
OPEC regimes. Western arms
and intervention unable to assure
survival of conservative regimes.
.41
[
Centrally planned economies
insulated from global economic
crisis. Shift from extensive to
intensive accumulation, with
technology the crucial constraint.
Priority given to the military
sector as the principal source of
technological progress - despite
acknowledged resource costs for
civilian economy.
Global economic crisis sharpens class struggles and more
LDCs follow a non-capitalist or socialist path. Progressive
potential of military governments and 'vanguard' armies
recognised, though urged to establish vanguard parties.
Soviet, E. European and Cuban arms and military aid for
beleaguered 'states of socialist orientation'.
Soviet military power ensures
cohesion of the WTO and safety
of the socialist camp. Detente
allows class struggle to continue,
gradually shifting international
correlation of forces in favour of
socialism. I
J
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Economic recovery of North
achieved through military cuts.
resource transfers to South,
removal of protectionist barriers
and international monetary re-
forms (increased liquidity, stable
exchange rates and long-term
funding of Third World debts).
Institutions of international
economic management (World
Bank, IMF) strengthened and
reformed, Increased Southern
participation.
t
Multipolar global economy. Re-
location of industrial production
toward South encouraged by
dtsmantling of Northern pro-
tective barriers.sharing oftechno-
logy and codes of conduct for
MNCs.
Common security on basis of
NATO-WTO strategic parity.
NATO foregoes space weapons
and new missiles in Europe
pending multilateral nuclear
cuts and chemical disarmament.
Reduced military spending and
conversion to civilian production.
Stronger UN.
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t
IOstpolitik creating climate for
further Confidence Building '4
Measures, mutual force re-
ductions and nuclear-weapon- '4
free-zone in Central Europe.
y
Broader adherence to NPT and
fuller international control of
sensitive parts of nuclear fuel
cycle.
THE BRANDT-PALME-THORSSON SCENARIO
!pt '4
4. '4
4. 4.
4.. 4.
.4 4.
.4
4.
International energy strategy to
control prices and decrease
reliance on non-renewable
energy. Funds from capital-
surplus countries 'tricycled' to
LDCs in partnership with
Northern technology and finan-
cial intermediaries.
t
Accelerated development of LDCs facilitated by stabilisation
of export earnings and increased flow of resources on better
financial terms. Shift toward multilateral assistance with less
stringent IMF conditionality and no political strings. Priority
given to basic needs, food and population programmes, in the
poorest countries. Increased South-South trade and economic
cooperation. J
(Interdependence
of capitalist
and centrally planned economies
with the latter taking more
positive role in the NIEO.
74
Full Soviet and WTO partici-
pation in military reductions, on
basis of parity with the West.
Military cuts in developed and developing countries release
resources for aid and development. Negotiation of supplier
and recipient guidelines for arms transfers. Strengthening of
UN peacekeeping in TW and encouragement of. regional
security arrangements, including Regional Conferences on
Security and Cooperation, zones of peace and nuclear-
weapon-free-zones.
r»
-»
Planned recovery and transfor-
mation of North through coordi-
nated reflation. energy saving,
industrial restructunng and
military cuts. Social control over
production; industrial demo-
r cracy. Rehabilitated Welfare
State. Work and leisure redefined
around new technologies.
t
Y
Cooperation among W. Euro-
pean social democracies, trans-
cending geographical limits,
structures and policies of existing
Common Market and making
the latter (e.g. the CAP) more
compatible with TW develop-
ment.
A
[ Selective protection and planned
trade expansion to ensure com-
L plementarity of Northern re-
covery and 1W industrialisation.
Tight control over MNC
operations in TW.
Nuclear freeze, then unilateral
arms reductions, paving way for
multilateral negotiations. Deep
military spending cuts and
planned conversion to civilian
uses. Political mobilisation
through new (peace, greens,
women's) social movements as
well as trades unions and socialist
parties.
t
y
Step by step dealignment of
Europe from NATO, starting
with the withdrawal of Cruise
and Pershing, Nuclear-weapons-
free-zone in Europe and
development of an alternative
non-nuclear defence.
Full implemention of NPT.
Tight control over arms transfers,
especially to authoritarian
regimes.
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION SCENARIO
t
,1 tttt%% t
tttt
( for more ecologically sound use
Energy and resource-saving
policies in North, creating basis
t t.' of global resources.ss t.
[ Break in link between oil sur-
pluses and arms transfers. Settle-
ment of conflicts in resource-rich
» regions of Third World on basis
of social justice (for Palestinians,
black South Africans etc.) rather
than strategic interests.
$
Economic reform - decentrali-
sation, market mechanisms -
within socialist framework.
Economic and political rap-
prochement with West.
Structural transformation of 1W economies, emphasis on
social justice, basic needs, self reliant development. Greater
South-South economic cooperation. Better terms for aid and
trade, rather than resource transfers from the North as such.
Reduction in East-West tension,
allowing dealignment of E.
Europe from Warsaw Treaty,
Cuts in military spending and
emergence of less repressive
political structures and move-
ments inside the socialist
countries. I
Non-alignment and demilitarisation in 1W, releasing
resources for development. Military delinking from North
(reduced arms transfers, military aid, training, bases, etc.).
Non-aggression pacts, nuclear-weapons-free-zones and 'zones
of peace'. Stronger UN and regional peacekeeping machinery.
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IPRA CONFERENCE 1986
The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) will be holding its eleventh
biennial General Conference at the University of Sussex on 1 3th-1 8th April 1 986.
The theme of the Conference will be 'Just Peace Through Global Transformation:
Towards a Global Decade for Peace'. The Conference reflects the concerns of the UN
International Year of Peace (1986) with sessions on conflict resolution, human rights,
militarisation of language and culture, non-violence, peace and development, peace
education and peace movements.
IPRA was founded in 1 964 to advance interdisciplinary research into the conditions of
peace and the causes of war and other forms of violence. There are now members in 55
countries. Over the past 21 years, IPRA has encouraged worldwide cooperation
designed to assist the advancement of peace research and, in particular, has aided the
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